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In this paper, I defend the epistemic role of moral emotions. After some introduc-
tory remarks, by making use of an attitudinal theory of emotions, I claim that 
emotions are to be conceived as intentional states directed towards evaluative 
properties in the world, and have therefore both correctness conditions and justi-
fication conditions. Then, I define and list moral emotions, and I defend the objec-
tive status of evaluative and moral properties. Such preliminary moves allow me 
to make my main point. Firstly, when discussing the standards to assess if moral 
emotions’ formal object can be counted as an epistemic one, I propose a threefold 
intentionality theory of moral emotions, which allows me to equate their second-
ary formal objects to those of epistemic emotions. Secondly, when considering the 
roles moral emotions must play in order to be counted as epistemically relevant, I 
defend both the direct justificatory role and the indirect motivational role of mor-
al emotions.  
 
Keywords  




It is almost commonplace to say that recent decades, from the 80s 
onwards, have witnessed a resurgence of interest – after a long ne-
glect – in the research on emotions, and on the link between emo-
tions, formation of judgements, and thought. Within such general 
trend, the role of emotions in judgement formation has been ex-
plored in relation to different fields of knowledge, and has led to the 
recognition of a specific kind of knowledge-related emotions, i.e., ep-
istemic emotions, such as intellectual courage, generosity, humility, 
and so on2 (Morton 2010). These are “emotions that play an im-
                                                          
1 ms.vaccarezza@gmail.com. 
2 A more complete list would include curiosity, interest, surprise, trust, feeling of 
knowing, feeling of familiarity, feeling of forgetting, tip of the tongue feeling, 
feeling of certainty, feeling of doubt (Meylan 2014). 
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portant role in our attempts to acquire beliefs correctly” (Morton 
2010: 2), or, more specifically, “emotions that are specifically directed 
at epistemic ends” (Morton 2010: 2). Much work is being done to 
highlight the role played by epistemic emotions in epistemic activities 
such as deliberation, beliefs’ revision and inquiry. However, a similar 
effort seems to be lacking for what concerns the epistemic role of 
other kinds of emotions, and, among others, of moral emotions, such 
as shame, pride, admiration, and all the emotions directly related to 
the appreciation of value and to the formation of moral reasoning 
and judgements. Though it has been very much stressed how far 
moral emotions do contribute to the disclosure of value(s) and/or 
moral principles, less has been said about how such disclosure may 
amount to an improvement of the agent’s moral knowledge, or help 
her moral cognitive abilities and activities, and, therefore, the corre-
sponding emotions may be said to play an epistemic role. The pur-
pose of this paper is filling such gap, arguing for a link between the 
research carried out on moral emotions in philosophy and psycholo-
gy, and the advancement of the study of epistemic emotions. The 
importance of such move is not limited to the theoretical level. Be-
sides making a conceptual point, I believe my argument can prove 
powerful as for its practical potentialities, especially those concerning 
the motivational role played by moral emotions. As I will show at §4.3 
and stress in the conclusion of the paper, developing (some families 
of) moral emotions might be a cutting-edge answer to the pressing 
question about how to trigger interest in publicly relevant issues.  
In what follows, I firstly make a premise (§1) concerning the ac-
count of emotions I make use of. There, I embrace an attitudinal the-
ory of emotions, and I claim that emotions are to be conceived as in-
tentional states directed towards evaluative properties in the world, 
and have therefore both correctness conditions and justification con-
ditions. After such explanation, at §2, I define moral emotions and I 
list them. Then, I defend the objective status of evaluative properties 
and moral properties (§3). At §4, I argue for moral emotions’ epis-
temic role by discussing the standards (§4.1) to assess if their formal 
object can be counted as an epistemic one, and the roles moral emo-
tions must play in order to be counted as epistemically relevant (§4.2, 
§4.3). At the end of this path, I conclude by highlighting some practi-
cal implications of my argument.  
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1. What is an emotion 
 
Before outlining my main argument, I need to explain the account of 
emotions I will make use of. As to how emotions are to be conceived, 
various stances can be taken. It would be beyond the scope of this 
paper addressing them all at length; it seems enough to say that I will 
here move from a perspective rooted in the attitudinal theory of 
emotions. Unlike evaluative judgement theories (see Nussbaum 
1994, Sorabji 2003, Roberts 2003), that assimilate emotions to evalu-
ative judgements3, and the “Jamesian” family of the perceptual theo-
ries (see Damasio 2000, Prinz 2004, Goldie 2000, Tappolet 2000, 
2016, Deonna 2006, and, in a weaker form, Zagzebski 2003), that 
consider emotions as essentially felt, and assimilate them to percep-
tions4, the attitudinal theory of emotions equates emotions with “dis-
tinct attitudes towards the objects provided by their cognitive bases” 
(Deonna and Teroni 2012: 89). Each emotion, according to this per-
spective, “consists in a specific felt bodily stance towards objects or 
situations, which is incorrect as a function of whether or not these 
objects and situations exemplify the relevant evaluative property” 
(Deonna and Teroni 2012: 89). This theory shares in the emphasis of 
perceptual theories on the felt character of emotions, as well as in 
their way of accounting for the intentionality and phenomenology of 
emotions. However, it also seems to avoid successfully their weak-
nesses, as well as to make sense of the phenomenology of emotions 
in a more compelling way. 
                                                          
3 Evaluative judgement theories seem to have an advantage as for the 
specification of the correctness conditions, as well as the justification conditions 
of emotions. However, a number of objections may be raised against them. To 
put it briefly, it does not seem compelling to claim that an evaluative belief is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for an emotion to arise, and many 
counterexamples can be provided against such claim. For a detailed discussion, 
see Deonna and Teroni (2012: 52-61). 
4 Doubtless, contemporary perceptual theories, by assimilating emotions to 
direct perceptions of values, easily account for their justificatory power, i.e. their 
being potential reasons for the corresponding evaluative judgements (as we will 
see in more detail at §4.2). However, they fail to take into adequate account the 
significant differences between perceptions and emotions, and deny the need of 
reasons for emotions to be justified, risking therefore to fall into an intuitionism 
about evaluative properties, and to posit “a mysterious perceptual or quasi-
perceptual relation to values” (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 71). 
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Grounding on the attitudinal theory of emotions, it is possible to 
outline an account of the general traits of emotions. Emotions differ 
from other psychological states, such as moods, sentiments, desires, 
traits and virtues. They are “episodes that have a felt character and 
are directed at particular objects provided by their cognitive bases” 
(Deonna and Teroni 2012: 11). Let us deepen this definition a little. 
First, similarly to desires, they are felt, i.e., they involve bodily sensa-
tions or feelings, which represent a reaction to some objects; unlike 
desires, however, they seem to be closely related to evaluative 
judgements, and, most importantly, to be intentional states, i.e. to 
have a “mind-to-world direction of fit” (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 6), 
a respect under which they are closer to perceptions than to desires. 
They are therefore susceptible of being correct or incorrect, rather 
than satisfied or unsatisfied: i.e., they can attach to a proper inten-
tional object, or they can fail to do it. In other words, they “have a 
content in the light of which it is possible to assess whether they fit 
the facts or not” (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 71).  
However, unlike perceptions, emotions can turn out to be justified 
or unjustified, meaning that the agent experiencing an emotion – say, 
fear – may turn out to have or lack good reasons to depict (and thus 
experience) a situation as such (say, fearful). From this perspective, 
they share more in the nature of beliefs, which stand in need of rea-
sons, than in that of desires, or even perceptions. To sum up, emo-
tions have both correctness conditions and justification conditions, 
logically independent from each other, but both dependent on their 




2. Moral emotions: a sketch 
 
Within the general resurgence of interest for emotions, and for the 
role they play in judgement formation, a substantial place is occupied 
by moral emotions, i.e., emotions directly related to the appreciation 
of moral value, such as shame, pride, admiration, etc. A good defini-
tion of moral emotions would label them as “self-evaluative, self-
conscious or other-oriented emotions in response to morally salient 
situations” (Malti-Dys 2015), related with one’s evaluative judgments 
and appraisals, and which can be positively or negatively valenced 
(see Malti and Latzko 2012, Tracy et al. 2007). Even if some debate is 
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still taking place on the exact way to distinguish moral and non-moral 
emotions, it is now widely accepted that moral emotions would be 
emotions whose evaluative formal object instantiates a certain moral 
value (see Cova, Deonna and Sander 2015: 397).  
To sum up, emotions cannot be treated as a whole: even if they 
share in a common nature, a remarkable difference can be found be-
tween those states which are addressed towards an evaluative prop-
erty simply speaking (such as fearfulness, dangerousness, etc.), and 
those that are directed, more specifically, to moral properties, be 
they principles, values, or norms. A growing attention is being devot-
ed to such phenomena, both in the psychological5 and philosophical 
field, where emotions in general – and the moral ones in particular – 
are becoming increasingly central, at the expenses of the solitary, 
leading role once played by reason and moral reasoning, and occupy 
different places in morality, depending on the theory of emotion em-
braced (see §1).  
When it comes to listing moral emotions, the research of Jona-
than Haidt is a landmark. In his 2003 work, he defines moral emotions 
as “those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either 
of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or 
agent”, and he singles out four families of moral emotions: the other-
condemning family, the self-conscious family, the other-suffering 
family, and the other-praising family. Emotions belonging to the oth-
er-condemning family (contempt, anger, and disgust), act as “guardi-
ans of the moral order”, in that they are elicited by violations of the 
moral order, and they make people conform to social rules. Anger is a 
response to unjustified insults, as well as to “frustration and goal 
blockage mixed with more moral concerns about being betrayed, in-
sulted, and treated unfairly” (Haidt 2003); it may well elicit selfish and 
antisocial actions, but its point being redressing injustice, it may also 
be elicited by situations where the self is not involved, and it may mo-
tivate the desire for a restoration of justice on behalf of the offended 
part. Disgust, on which so much has been said, can be described as a 
“guardian of the temple of the body” (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley and 
                                                          
5 In this paper, I choose to let many psychological questions unaddressed, such as 
those concerning the emergence and development of moral emotions, as well as 
questions raised in many fields other than philosophy, such as neuroscience, 
economy, genetics, and sociology. On the crucial question of the naturalness of 
moral emotions, vs their resulting from social conditioning, as well as on their 
evolutionary or biological rootedness, see De Sousa 2001. 
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Imada 1997, Rozin, Haidt and McCauley 1993), for “it is triggered by 
people who violate local cultural rules for how to use their bodies, 
particularly in domains of sex, drugs, and body modification” (Haidt 
and Hersh 2001, MacCoun 1998). It aims at ostracizing those who 
jeopardizes the moral order, and in doing so its ultimate action ten-
dency can be seen as a prosocial one, i.e., the preservation of the 
moral order.  
Contempt, finally, is a “downward” gaze towards some individual, 
in light of their moral inferiority, or of the gap between the position 
one holds in society, and their moral worth. It involves “looking down 
on someone and feeling morally superior” (Haidt 2003, see also Izard 
1977).  
The second family of moral emotions listed by Haidt is the self-
conscious family, which comprises shame, embarrassment, and guilt, 
i.e., emotions which help people to “monitor and constrain their own 
behaviour”, in order to avoid “triggering the contempt, anger, and 
disgust of others” (Haidt 2003). While embarrassment arises from the 
awareness of the violation of some social (non-moral) convention, 
shame “is […] typically elicited by one’s own perceived violation of a 
moral norm” (Haidt 2003, see also Keltner and Buswell 1996, 
Tangney, Miller, Flicker and Barlow 1996). The same holds for guilt, 
which is caused by “the violation of moral rules and imperatives”. 
Guilt can be distinguished from shame for its specificity, since it does 
not appraise the whole self as bad, but only the specific action at 
stake. All the three emotions of these family are said to motivate ac-
tion tendencies directed at making up for one’s faults, or conforming 
to the violated moral order. Compassion is the only emotion belong-
ing to the other-suffering family. Often mistakenly confused with em-
pathy or sympathy, compassion is the emotion of “being moved by 
another’s suffering”, and its moral nature is to be found mainly in its 
conceptual link with guilt, and in its direct pro-social tendency, in that 
it makes people want to “help, comfort, or otherwise alleviate the 
suffering of the other” (Haidt 2003, see also Batson, O’Quinn, Fulty, 
Vanderplass and Isen 1983, Batson and Shaw 1991). 
Finally, emotions which belong to the other-praising family (grati-
tude and elevation) have good deeds and moral exemplars as their 
formal objects; unlike the previous (mostly) negatively valenced emo-
tions, they do not activate in the presence of a fault or a violation, but 
in positive cases where moral value is displayed. Therefore, they are 
positively valenced, and seem to relate more directly with positive 
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values. Among them, the emotion Haidt calls “elevation” – some-
times discussed under the name of admiration6 – might be argued to 
be “the most prototypical moral emotion of all” (Haidt 2003). While 
gratitude is elicited by deeds which benefit the self, Haidt’s elevation 
is an uninterested state, in that it arises in the presence of a moral 
exemplar and/or a moral deed which does not benefit the self, and it 
seems to be elicited by the beauty of the moral in itself.  
 
 
3. Against subjectivism about evaluative and moral properties 
 
At this point, before arguing for the epistemic role of moral emotions, 
another remark is needed in light of what I have just claimed about 
the nature of emotions and moral emotions. Talking of correctness 
conditions and justification conditions of emotions, as I have just 
done, implies holding a form of objectivism about evaluative proper-
ties (as for emotions in general) and about moral properties (as for 
moral emotions). Indeed, only the claim that evaluative properties ex-
ist independently of emotional responses allows to elaborate an ac-
count of the conditions under which emotions may be thought to be 
correct and justified. Also, a defence of the objectivity and anteced-
ence of value is needed, if one wants to avoid the view according to 
which emotions are mere projections of subjective desires on a neu-
tral, valueless world7. Therefore, this paper defends the cognitive po-
tentialities of emotions in light of objectivism about evaluative prop-
erties. Many stances can be taken on the way evaluative properties 
are related to the natural ones, as well as on the naturalness and re-
ality of moral properties. As for the relationship between evaluative 
and natural properties, the account I adopt here depicts it in terms of 
supervenience, claiming that evaluative properties supervene on the 
                                                          
6 In a philosophical perspective, Zagzebski (2015) has been among the first who 
favored a retrieval of admiration after a long neglect. In her recent works, she 
argues, against Aristotle, that admiration is a pleasant other-praising emotion 
directed to moral excellence. Following Kristjansson, she distinguishes between 
Pleasant Admiration (PA), Admiring Envy (AE) and Spiteful Envy (SE). Her 
pioneering work, however, is admittedly in need of further theoretical and 
empirical support. On the other hand, in the psychological literature the topic of 
admiration has been only partially and mainly indirectly taken into account (e.g. 
van de Ven-Zeelenberg 2009, van de Ven et al. 2011, van de Ven et al. 2015). 
7 See Antonaccio 2001. 
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natural ones, while being sui generis and distinct from them (see De-
onna and Teroni 2012: 50).  
Some more explanation needs to be provided regarding moral 
properties. We have seen that evaluative properties (such as danger-
ousness) supervene on the natural ones, while remaining distinct. 
However, things appear to be more complex as for moral properties, 
whose reality does not seem to be “there”, like the dangerousness of 
the dog is, and whose assessment seems to depend on something 
more than describing certain features or natural properties of a given 
situation (unless we buy some form of naïf realism or of quite radical 
moral naturalism). When it comes to establishing the correctness 
conditions of moral emotions, we can distinguish between five main 
positions on the matter of the relation between moral emotions and 
moral properties: extreme Subjectivism, Foundationalism, Natural-
ism, Axiologism, and extreme Objectivism (De Sousa 2001: 116). 
What I embrace here, is the “axiological hypothesis” about moral 
emotions, which, unlike both extreme Subjectivism and Objectivism, 
claims that the “order of reality to which emotions give us access is 
the relatively objective world of human values” (De Sousa 2001: 120), 
meaning that “the realities revealed by emotions are local to certain 
organisms in certain environments”, and therefore combining a cer-
tain degree of objectivity with the claim that “there is no independ-
ent access to the world revealed by emotion” (De Sousa 2001: 120). 
As for the relationship between natural and moral properties, the ax-
iological hypothesis leads to a further view, i.e. axiological holism. Ax-
iological holism has it that judging whether an emotion is referring to 
a genuine moral property or value is a task that cannot be performed 
by appealing to an external criterion, and is rather a matter of apply-
ing reflexive equilibrium, and comparing the perceptual information 
provided by moral emotions with information provided by other 
emotions, as well as with reasons, background knowledge, and sense 
perceptions. Such remarks will prove central when arguing for the ep-
istemic role played by moral emotions in the following section. 
 
 
4. Which epistemic role for moral emotions? 
 
Given the attitudinal theory I embrace, since moral emotions have a 
formal object, represented by the action or situation they are elicited 
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by, in order for them to be correct and justified they have to meet 
the same conditions as standard emotions. However, at this point we 
can move a step forward, and ask: can moral emotions be the source 
of moral knowledge, rather than only being correct and/or justified in 
light of a pre-existent moral knowledge? Or, in other words, can mor-
al emotions be reasons, besides having reasons? Generally speaking, 
we might answer: not only are moral emotions forms of sensitivities 
to norms, rules, and values, but, more radically, they represent the 
only way we can appreciate them, via the appreciation of their formal 
object; they allow us to acknowledge them as norms, rules, and val-
ues, and to see their normative force. Is this enough to argue for an 
epistemic role of moral emotions? The answer to this latter question 
would surely be negative, without a further clarification of such role. 
Thus, in order to make sense of it, and to defend a properly epistemic 
relevance of moral emotions, I need to address two different kind of 
sub-questions, concerning the standards and roles which allow us to 
consider an emotion as epistemic. By standards, I mean (as scholars 
of epistemic emotions generally do) the criteria that need to be met 
in order to define an emotion as epistemic, and that refer to its in-
trinsic nature, whereas the roles help us discriminate between epis-
temic and non-epistemic emotions in terms of the way they contrib-
ute (or fail to contribute) to specific epistemic processes, such as be-
lief, judgement formation, and deliberation. If I will succeed in show-
ing that moral emotions respond to analogous standards and play 
roles which appear similar to that of epistemic emotions, their cogni-
tive and epistemic role will be ipso facto proved as well.  
 
 
4.1. Standards: primary and secondary formal object 
 
The question of the standards amounts to asking what counts as epis-
temic and what does not; or, in other words, according to which cri-
terion an emotion can be said to be epistemic. The typical response 
to such question makes reference to the object of an emotion. As I 
have noted, emotions are intentional states. This means that not only 
do emotions have an object; more precisely, they display a twofold 
intentionality. That is, they are directed at two distinct objects: a par-
ticular object (say, my dog; my lie) and an evaluative property (say, 
my dog’s being dangerous; my lie’s being shameful). Such distinction, 
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besides applying to every emotion, leads also to a criterion to distin-
guish between epistemic and non-epistemic emotions, i.e., what has 
been called the Formal Object Standard of Epistemicity (FOS), accord-
ing to which “an emotion is epistemic if and only if its formal object is 
an epistemic value” (Meylan 2014). This criterion, prima facie, would 
exclude moral emotions, whose formal objects are other than epis-
temic values, from the set of epistemic emotions. But, is this the only 
admissible standard? Or, to put it another way, can really be seen as 
epistemic only states whose formal object is the truth? The implausi-
bility of the latter claim has led some (e.g. Meylan 2014) to deny the 
very possibility of talking about epistemic emotions as a natural kind 
at all, in that there seems to be no emotion directly aimed at truth as 
its formal object. However, another route is possible. When trying to 
defend the epistemic status of some epistemic emotions, such as 
surprise, interest and trust, which do not seem to have the truth as 
their direct (or primary) formal object, a way of holding their belong-
ing in the same epistemic domain is to show that they hold a specific 
relation with a final epistemic evaluative property, e.g., that of being 
true. This strategy, first hinted at by Meylan, has not been taken seri-
ously by any other scholar. However, I think it might prove a useful 
conceptual tool, and should be developed further. Therefore, follow-
ing this intuition, I argue that, as for standard emotions, a twofold in-
tentionality theory of emotions holds true, in that each justified emo-
tion (say, my tenderness/fear) may be said to have: 
- a particular object (the cuddly/barking dog Riccio); 
- a primary (evaluative) formal object (Riccio’s being cute/dangerous). 
However, as for epistemic and moral emotions things seem to be 
slightly more complex. In this case, I think a threefold intentionality 
theory applies, i.e. one which makes sense of their having both a pri-
mary and a secondary formal object.  
Thus, according to a threefold intentionality theory of epistemic 
emotions, each justified epistemic emotion has: 
- a particular object (the proposition p); 
- a primary (evaluative) formal object (p’s being interesting, surpris-
ing, etc.); 
- a secondary (epistemic) formal object (p’s being interesting, surpris-
ing, etc. qua true). 
Similarly, a threefold intentionality theory of moral emotions, has 
it that, in case they are justified, they have:  
- a particular object (my lie/X’s outstandingly generous action); 
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- a primary (evaluative/moral) formal object (my lie’s being shame-
ful/X’s outstandingly generous action’s being admirable); 
- a secondary (epistemic) formal object (my lie’s being shameful/ X’s 
outstandingly generous action’s being admirable qua morally true). 
This move, as it is clear, amounts to equate moral emotions’ sec-
ondary formal objects to those of epistemic emotions. If one accepts 
it, besides solving the problem of how to treat different epistemic 
emotions as a whole, one is committed to consider moral emotions 
as a sub-set of epistemic ones. Thus, introducing a threefold inten-
tionality theory allows hitting two birds with a stone: not only makes 
it room for the epistemic role of standard and moral emotions, but it 
also helps the theorists of epistemic emotions themselves facing the 




4.2. Reasons for emotions, emotions as reasons: the justificatory role 
 
Once established that the moral emotions’ secondary formal object 
can be counted as an epistemic one, the second problem I need to 
address is that of roles. Following Engel, I acknowledge two main 
kinds of role played by epistemic emotions: a justificatory (i.e., nor-
mative) role – which corresponds to the ability to justify our judg-
ments – and a motivational (i.e., non-normative) role, which amounts 
to an instigation of inquiry, or to a causal influence on the conduct of 
inquiry, or to a revision of our current doxastic attitudes (i.e. beliefs, 
suspension of judgements, disbeliefs). The first role, as I shall explain, 
is a directly epistemic one, whereas the latter has only indirect epis-
temic consequences. In this first sub-section, I will argue for a justifi-
catory role played by moral emotions, whereas in the following I will 
claim they have a motivational role (see §4.3).  
One way of claiming that emotions play a direct justificatory role 
is to commit to a (direct or indirect) perceptual theory of emotions, 
such as Tappolet’s and, in a weaker form, Zagzebski’s. According to 
such view, as already stated, emotions are comparable to sensory 
perceptions. Thus, as Tappolet puts it, they have justificatory power, 
since “though defeasible, they confer prima facie justification to eval-
uative beliefs, so that these beliefs will play an important role in the 
assessment of the other beliefs you hold” (Tappolet 2016: 168). This 
claim fits both with a foundationalist account of justification, and with 
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a broadly coherentist framework. Also, it can be expressed in 
Rawlsian terms, by making use of the notion of reflective equilibrium. 
As Kauppinen has it, beliefs based on emotions represent, in this ac-
count, “initially credible starting points in a process of seeking reflec-
tive equilibrium” (Kauppinen 2013: 361). 
However, important objections may be raised against perceptual 
theories, the strongest being the undeniable existence of cognitive 
bases for emotions, which seem primarily “states for which reasons 
are needed”, rather than “states that provide us with reasons”. Also, 
perceptual theories are likely to fall into a form of intuitionism about 
evaluative properties, and to expose to the critiques usually connect-
ed to it. Another, far safer, way, is via the attitudinal theory, defend-
ed here at §1. Unlike perceptual theories, the attitudinal theory de-
picts emotions as “attitudes that we adopt towards contents provid-
ed by other mental states” (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 91), i.e., their 
cognitive bases. As we have already seen, conceiving of emotions as 
epistemologically dependent from their cognitive bases best accounts 
for the possibility of asking why-questions about the emotions, as 
well as for the fact that emotions, unlike perceptions, appear to be 
states “for which we have or lack reasons” (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 
91). However, this does not imply denying that they also play im-
portant epistemological roles: since they cause evaluative judge-
ments, although standing in need of justification, they also justify 
such judgements. They have, therefore, the twofold nature of states 
both justified and justifying, both having and providing reasons. While 
the mere occurrence of an emotion is not in itself sufficient to justify 
the corresponding evaluative judgement, justified emotions – i.e., 
emotions whose justification depends on the nature of their bases – 
seem to provide sufficient reasons to make a justified evaluative 
judgement. Provided, then, that the cognitive bases of my fear make 
my present emotion of fear both correct and justified (i.e., the per-
ceived dog is really dangerous), my evaluative judgement of the dog 
as dangerous, issued by my fear of the dog, would be justified. I have, 
therefore, two routes to justify evaluative judgements: an emotional 
one, and another bypassing emotions. At this point, one might ask 
whether emotions are not epistemically redundant, given the exist-
ence of another possible route to justify evaluative judgements. But 
the answer is negative, for, as Deonna and Teroni highlight, “our 
awareness of the properties that justify our evaluative judgements 
must often be explained by our emotional sensitivity” (Deonna and 
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Teroni 2012: 121). Thus, it is only as a matter of principle that evalua-
tive properties can be accessed without the relevant emotional sensi-
tivity, in that we would not even be able to categorize objects in 
terms of evaluative properties, had we not the relevant emotion.  
Emotions, therefore, may be said to represent “a privileged route 
to the knowledge of the evaluative properties that feature in their re-
spective correctness conditions” (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 121). 
Thus, they can be well said to play a direct justificatory role, even if a 
narrower one than that proposed by perceptual theories. 
Such remark, which holds true for emotions in general, is even 
more easily applied to the case of moral emotions, which have moral 
properties, rather than evaluative ones, as their primary formal ob-
ject. However, some caution is needed when handling the transition 
between “standard” non-epistemic emotions and moral ones, as for 
their justification and correctness conditions. Given their peculiar na-
ture, moral emotions are justified and correct, depending both on the 
truth of the natural properties the moral ones supervene on, and on 
that of the moral properties they attach to, as to their proper formal 
objects. However, establishing the moral truth of a moral property – 
as noted when introducing the axiological hypothesis at §3 – does not 
simply involve checking all the relevant facts, or measuring one’s 
emotion against an external criterion, but has to do with engaging in 
a moral reflection which, in turn, implies having a fine-tuned sensitivi-
ty to the relevant moral reasons, and a set of other well-developed 
emotions. Even more than in the case of the other emotions, the ep-
istemic access to the relevant moral knowledge is only in principle 
available by means of mere reason, and normally requires, among 
other conditions, the possession and exercise of moral emotions, 
whose correctness qua moral is verifiable only by means of reflective 
equilibrium.  
In sum, despite being justified qua emotions, justified moral emo-
tions, qua moral, do constitute a privileged basis for moral judge-
ments and knowledge, and provide therefore a non-replaceable ac-
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4.3. Epistemic consequences of non-epistemic emotions: the motiva-
tional role 
 
Not only, as we have just seen, do justified moral emotions play a di-
rect justificatory role; in this section, I claim that they also have indi-
rect epistemic consequences, in that they play the non-normative 
motivational role of generating epistemic emotions as an effect (see 
Morton 2010: 12).  
Indeed, moral emotions broadly conceived – even non-justified 
ones – can (and very often do) provide our inquiry with motives, or 
instigate it, and influence its conduct. Also, they may help the revision 
of our beliefs, or of our doxastic attitudes. Mainly, they can generate 
interest, a fundamental epistemic emotion, as an effect. Obviously 
enough, this role is not peculiar of moral emotions, but is shared by 
other non-epistemic emotions. Just think about how fear motivates 
one to know more about the features of the situation one is afraid of. 
My fear of snakes, e.g., provides me with a very strong motivation to 
be interested in their habitat, hibernation, etc. Due to my fear, I ap-
pear to be much more learned on what concerns snakes than any 
other non-phobic person I know. However, there seem to be other 
peculiar sub-roles moral emotions can play in addition.  
Indeed, moral emotions (or at least some of them) can generate 
(i) an interest, shared with other non-moral emotions, in knowing the 
non-moral facts of the situation. Also, they can foster (ii) an interest 
in knowing why the relevant moral properties supervene on such 
non-moral facts. Finally, they can further (iii) an interest in knowing 
more about the moral properties which are their cognitive bases.  
Just think about a moral emotion such as, say, compassion for 
immigrants, which is not only elicited by their suffering, but also by 
the awareness that they are victims of injustice. It turns out that it 
may foster my interest in the facts that make the condition of those I 
pity miserable (their personal history, the political and economic 
condition of their country of origin, etc.), so as to do what I can to 
help fix their situation; also, it may make me want to understand why 
their case is to be pitied, so that I can have reasons to offer to those 
who keep indifferent to the compassionate deeds of engaged social 
workers, or (more often) to supporters of political parties which op-
pose inclusive immigration policies. Finally, it can motivate me under-
taking a reflective journey towards a more detailed picture of my 
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moral landscape, so to understand more about compassion, broadly 
conceived, and its link with justice or with other central moral and/or 
political values. This interest, in turn, may generate other epistemic 
emotions, such as curiosity and surprise for what I discover, and, 
once obtained the information needed, a feeling of certainty, or, on 
the other hand, doubt. Therefore, a wide range of epistemic emo-
tions can be generated by a single non-epistemic moral emotion.  
The same can be shown for other moral emotions, such as, e.g., 
elevation. Elevation, as noted earlier, can be seen as the exact oppo-
site of disgust, in that it is elicited by moral beauty. Experiencing ele-
vation “seems to create a more generalized desire to become a bet-
ter person oneself, and to follow the example of the moral exemplar” 
(Haidt 2003). It starts an opening process, since it “opens people up 
to new possibilities for action and thought, making them more recep-
tive” (Haidt 2003). Besides motivating prosocial behaviour, elevation 
seems therefore to represent a deeply knowledge-related moral 
emotion. Not only does it reveal the moral value embodied by the 
exemplars who elicit it; it also fosters emotional dispositions such as 
curiosity, interest, and openness.  
Also, being awe’s moral counterpart, it has surprise as one of its 
constitutive traits. Feeling elevated by, say, Oskar Schindler’s deeds, 
makes me want to know more about the relevant facts (the condition 
of Polish Jews during the Nazi occupation). Also, it provides me with 
an increased interest in the values involved, as well as in their viola-
tion, and in the ways of preventing such violations in the future. Such 
deepening process may involve the activation of other epistemic and 
moral emotions: anger, contempt, or disgust for the awful facts I 
come across; compassion for the victims of such injustices; elevation 
for other people whose courageous deeds helped save lives; and, 
such as in the previous compassion example, curiosity or surprise, 
certainty or doubt, and an increased knowledge of my own set of val-





The examples provided highlighted the importance of both moral and 
(properly) epistemic emotions for belief revision, opening, self-
knowledge and self-awareness, as well as for moral motivation and 
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action. Therefore, the conclusion of this paper is twofold. From a 
theoretical standpoint, I think the arguments provided showed with 
enough clarity that moral emotions can be counted as epistemically 
relevant, in that they meet the standards, and play the two main 
roles, ascribed to epistemic emotions. Secondly, at a practical level, 
as the analysis of the motivational role has suggested, developing (at 
least some families of8) moral emotions proves to be both an ex-
tremely powerful way of triggering interest in publicly relevant issues, 
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